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Shari'a Law in the Sudan: Why it Does
Not Work Under the Sudanese
Constitutions of 1973 and 1985
I. Introduction
The following statement appeared in the September 20, 1988,
edition of the Washington Post:
The Sudanese cabinet . . . approved a harsh new code of

Islamic Shari'a Law ....
Among the punishments spelled out
in the criminal code are death by stoning for the offense of adultery, 100 lashes with a whip and five years in prison for the
offense of homosexuality, . . death for the offense of apostacy,'
. . . crucifixion for armed robbers and amputation for petty

thieves.'
This excerpt provides a few examples of punishments included in the
Sudanese Penal Code Act of 1988. 3 Many individuals, including Sudanese, were shocked by what appear to be unconstitutional violations of fundamental rights and freedoms. The Sudan is currently
embroiled in the fifth year of a civil war between forces of the Muslim leadership in the north and non-Muslims of the south, primarily
over the application of this Shari'a Law.4 This religious demarcation
exists because Shari'a Law, the religious law of Muslims, is contrary
to the beliefs of non-Muslims. 5 Fundamentalist Muslims, however,
I. Apostacy is defined as the renunciation of the creed of Islam (Islamic religion).
Harden, Sudanese Cabinet Approves a Harsh New Code of Criminal Punishment, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 20, 1988, at Al6. See THE EFFECT OF ISLAMIC LEGISLATION ON CRIME PREVENTION IN SAUDI ARABIA 84 (Ministry of the Interior, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 1980)
(Proceedings of the Symposium held in Riyadh, 16-21 Shawal 1396 A.H. (9-13 October
1976)) [hereinafter THE EFFECT OF THE ISLAMIC LEGISLATION].
2. Harden, supra note I.
3. At the time the article was written, the Penal Code Act of 1988 [hereinafter 1988
Penal Code] had been passed by the Council of Ministers (cabinet) but had not yet been
passed by the Constituent Assembly (legislature). Harden, supra note 1.
4. The civil war actually began in 1955 over the issue of autonomy for the Southern
region of the Sudan. The autonomy issue was resolved and the civil war ended in 1972 with
the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement. This agreement was abrogated by the Sudanese
government in 1981 and the civil war over autonomy was renewed. The application of Shari'a
Law did not become an issue in the civil war until 1983 when President Numeiri promulgated
the new Shari'a penal code. SUDAN: A COUNTRY STUDY 56, 60-62 (H. Nelson ed. 1982), 15
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: SUDAN 6-7 (1986)
[hereinafter 15
CONSTITUTIONS].

5. See infra section 11 and accompanying text. See generally Sudan, 1984 I.C.J.
30, 30 (Christians believe Islamic law favors Muslims and is unacceptable).
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control the government in the Sudan and insist on complete Islamization of the constitution and the laws enacted thereunder. 6 The
non-Muslims, on the other hand, assert that Shari'a Law is violative
of the Sudan's constitution and insist upon secularism.'
This Comment analyzes the validity of the non-Muslims' claim
that Shari'a Law and its codification in the Sudanese Penal Code
Act of 19838 and the 1988 Penal Code, are unconstitutional in light
of the democratic values espoused in the 1973 and 1985 Constitutions of the Sudan.9 In preparation for this constitutional analysis,
section II attempts to give the reader a basic understanding of
Shari'a Law. Section III analyzes the inherent unconstitutionality of
Shari'a Law in the context of the 1973 Sudanese Constitution,
which was in force in 1983 when the Shari'a Law was first codified.
Section IV analyzes the constitutionality of the Presidential promulgation and legislative enactment of Shari'a Law in the 1983 Penal
Code pursuant to the 1973 Constitution, and addresses several constitutionality problems within the 1983 Penal Code. Section V compares relevant similarities between the 1973 and 1985 Constitutions
and considers the constitutionality of Shari'a Law and the 1983 Penal Code pursuant to the 1985 Constitution. Section VI introduces
the 1988 Penal Code and comments on its constitutionality pursuant
to the 1985 Constitution. Section VII correlates sections II through
VI, responds to the non-Muslim constitutionality claims, and offers a
potential scenario concerning the future of the Islamic constitution.1"

II. Shari'a Law
To properly understand why Shari'a Law has become such a
controversial issue in the Sudan, it is necessary to understand the
concept of Shari'a. This understanding requires a brief historic ex6. See C. GURDON, SUDAN AT THE CROSSROADS 66-67 (1984); J. VOLL AND S. VOLL,
THE SUDAN: UNITY AND DIVERSITY IN A MULTICULTURAL STATE 93 (1985). "Fundamentalist
Muslims" refers to Muslims who espouse the traditional Islamic fundamentals of Shari'aLaw.
Id. A parallel can be drawn with American Jurists who espouse a strict interpretation of the
Constitution of the United States.
7. See C. GURDON, supra note 6, at 71 (concerning application of punishment);
Harden, supra note I ("gorilla movement . . . is prepared to fight for decades against any
Sudanese Government that rejects a secular code of justice"); Sudan, 1986 I.C.J. REV. 15, 20
(listing steps which the non-Muslims deem necessary before a constitutional conference can be
convened); and Sudan, supra note 5, at 30 (equal protection concerns).
8. The Penal Code Act of 1983 [hereinafter 1983 Penal Code] was the first codification
of Shari'a Law. See 15 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 4, at 1-7.
9. THE PERMANENT CONSTITUTION OF THE SUDAN (1973) [hereinafter 1973 CONSTITUTION] and THE TRANSITIONAL CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE SUDAN 1985
(1985) [hereinafter 1985 CONSTITUTION] used for this Comment were each at one time supplements in 15 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 4. The 1985 Constitution is the current
supplement.
10. An Islamic constitution is a constitution based upon concepts of Islamic law as opposed to democratic principles. J. VOLL AND S. VOLL, supra note 6, at 93.
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amination." Islamic law originated from a divine revelation to the
Prophet Muhammad. 2 Theologically, this can be compared to the
theory that Christian law originated from the divine revelation of the
Ten Commandments to Moses."3 Shari'a is the name Muslims give
to the revelation to Muhammad."'
Shari'a has several literal interpretations: "the road to the watering place," "the clear path to be followed,"' 5 or "the whole duty
of man."'" In the context of its relationship to the Sudanese Penal
Codes and Constitutions, however, Shari'asimply means "the sacred
law of Islam.' 7 It may, in fact, prove helpful to think of the terms
Islamic Law and Shari'aLaw as somewhat synonymous. Authorities
on Shari'a Law tend to agree that it encompasses the entire system
of Islamic Law, not just the penal law but daily religious, social, and
personal interactions as well."8 For the purpose of this Comment,
however, the term "Shari'aLaw" will be used to denote the relationship between specific criminal offenses and their respective
punishments.' 9
There are two types of criminal offenses and punishments under
Shari'a Law, specified and unspecified, representing three levels of
criminality: moral offenses against God (hada'° offenses), physical
offenses against man (kisas offenses), and moral offenses against
man and/or the state (ta'zir offenses). 2 ' Each level of crime requires
11. The depths to which one must go to develop even a basic understanding of Shari'a
Law are far beyond the scope and purpose of this Comment.
12. Muhammad, the Prophet of Islam, was born in 570 A.D. in Mecca and died in 632
A.D. S.H. AMIN, ISLAMIC LAW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD: INTRODUCTION, GLOSSARY,
AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

(1981);

1, 2 (1985); F.

HASSAN, THE CONCEPT OF STATE AND LAW IN ISLAM

THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

98

6-7 (M. Bassiouni ed. 1982).

13. In fact, Muhammad is believed to have received the last of the divine revelations of
God, the first being to Moses, the second to David (Psalms), and the third to Jesus. Muslims

consider all four men to be Prophets of God.

THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM,

supra

note 12, at 7; Tier, Freedom of Religion Under the Sudan Constitution and Laws, 26 J. AFR.
L. 133, 134 (1982).
14. S.H. AMIN, supra note 12, at 1; F. HASSAN, supra note 12, at 99.
15. Gordon, The Islamic Legal Revolution: The Case of Sudan, 19 INT'L LAW. 793,

800 (Summer 1985) (citing Schacht, Shari'a, in SHORTER

ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM

(1974)).
16. Id. (citing Vesey-Fitzgerald, Nature and Sources of the SHARI'A, in
MIDDLE EAST, VOL. 1: ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIC LAW

524

LAW IN THE

85 (1955)).

17.

Id. (citing J. SCHACHT, INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 1, n.1 (1964)).
18. See S.H. AMIN, supra note 12; F. HASSAN, supra note 12; Gordon, supra note 15.
19. The term "Shari'a Law" appears to be used generically by most modern authorities
to denote Islamic crimes and punishments. Possibly, this is because when Islamic law was
codified, what were essentially religious offenses became criminal offenses.
20. The hadd offenses are also referred to as Alhuddoud, Hudud, Hudood, or Hudoud
depending upon which authority is being read. Each hadd offense carries a hadd punishment,
hadd being the singular form of the word. To avoid confusion, the term hadd will be used
throughout this Comment to denote all the specified offenses against God, either collectively or
singularly. See generally note 21 infra (each using a different spelling of the plural)
21. AI-Thakeb and Scott, The Revitalization of Islamic Penal Law: An Examination of
Its Opponents, 5 INT'L J. COMP. & APPL. CRIM. JUST. 65, 66 (1981); J. SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW

175 (1964);

THE EFFECT OF ISLAMIC LEGISLATION,

supra note 1, at
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a different burden of proof; hadd offenses require specific evidence of
three or four witnesses, kisas offenses require only two witnesses,
and ta'zir offenses require only one witness. 22 Each level also provides different methods of punishment and permits a tribunal to employ different degrees of discretion in exacting such punishment.2"
The tribunal may exercise only the most limited amount of discretion in handing out punishments for the hadd offenses (specified
offenses against God). 2 There are seven of these offenses,2 5 each
carrying a punishment specified" in the Koran2 7 or the teachings of
the Prophet Muhammad. 8 These offenses and punishments are the
following: (1) adultery (punishable by lashes with a whip or by
death-by-stoning) and fornication (punishable by one-hundred lashes
with a whip), 2 9 (2) false accusations of adultery or fornication (punishable by eighty lashes with a whip), 30 (3) apostacy (punishable by
execution), 31 (4) consumption of alcohol (punishable by forty to
eighty lashes with a whip), 2 (5) theft (punishable by the amputation
of a hand or foot),33 (6) robbery (punishable by the amputation of a
hand or foot, unless aggravated by the death of the victim, then pun44. See generally S.H. AMIN, supra note 12, at 1-29 (general background into Islamic Law).
22. See sources cited supra note 21.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. An excellent discussion of these seven hadd offenses is available. See generally THE
EFFECT OF ISLAMIC LEGISLATION, supra note 1. The attendees of the symposium, and presumably the translators and editors, provide informative, readable discourse on the origins of the
hadd offenses and punishments citing chapter and verse of each hadd location in the Koran.
See infra note 27. See also J. SCHACHT, supra note 21, at 178-80; THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 12, at 24; AI-Thakeb and Scott, supra note 21, at 73 (Each lists
the seven hadd crimes and punishments.).
26. Specified offenses literally means specified in the Koran, see infra note 27, or the
Sunnah, see infra note 28.
27. The Koran is the Islamic Bible and is the primary source of Shari'a Law. It is also
subject to different spellings, i.e. Quran, Qur'an, Qu'ran. Koran is used throughout this Comment because it is the accepted English transliteration.
28. The teachings of the Prophet Muhammad are called Sunnah (also Alsunna and
Sunna) and are a record of the words and deeds of his life on earth. A parallel could be drawn
with portions of the New Testament of the Christian Bible recording certain events and teachings from the life of Jesus. See S.H. AMIN, supra note 12, at 9; THE EFFECT OF ISLAMIC
LEGISLATION, supra note 1, at 57; AI-Thakeb and Scott, supra note 21, at 66.
29. The punishment for adultery and fornication is described in the Koran, chapter 24,
verse 2 (as translated and cited in THE EFFECT OF ISLAMIC LEGISLATION, supra note I, at 100,
110). The Prophet Muhammad is said to have ordered death-by-stoning for a man and woman
who confessed to adultery. Id. at 109.
30. Falsely accusing someone of adultery or fornication [hereinafter defamation] is punished through the Koran, chapter 24, verse 4. Id. at 100.
31. Apostacy is defined as the renunciation of the Islamic religion and is punishable
according to the Koran, chapter 2, verse 217. Id. at 409. However, chapter 2, verse 256 of the
Koran states: "Let there be no compulsion in religion: Truth stands out Clear from Error." Id.
at 83.
32. Consumption of alcohol is doubly condemned in the Koran in chapter 4, verse 43
and chapter 5, verses 93 and 94 (which also prohibit gambling). Id. at 49-50.
33. Chapter 5, verse 41 of the Koran simply states "As to the thief male or female, cut
off his or her hands." Id. at 99.
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ishable by multiple amputation of limbs followed by crucifixion), 4
and (7) attempted overthrow of the government (punishable by execution).3 5 A tribunal has no discretion in determining the punishment for these offenses beyond dispensing of lashes. Nor does the
tribunal have discretion to determine the specific evidence required
for conviction." The general philosophy seems to be that when a
crime is committed against God, He should define the punishment;
man is in no position to question His wisdom in such matters.
The second level of criminal offenses consists of kisas offenses
(specified offenses against man). 3 7 These are strictly physical offenses consisting of murder, pre-meditated murder, involuntary
homicide, felonious pre-mediated assault, and serious accidental injury.3" The punishment scheme for these offenses is complicated and
involves one or a combination of three types of punishment: retaliation (based upon the eye-for-an-eye concept),39 atonement, and pay-

ment of blood money." Punishment can vary depending upon different levels of intent and culpability. 1 The tribunal appears to have a
great deal of discretion in determining the appropriate punishment,
but the victim or the victim's family is free to reject the tribunal's
determination and make a binding punishment agreement with the
offender.' 2 The reasoning behind this procedure seems to be that,
34. In chapter 5, verses 36 and 37, the Koran provides the various punishments for robbery. It should be noted that verse 37 also indicates that, in certain cases, the offender can
avoid punishment by repenting before capture. The crime then becomes a kisas offense. Id. at
47 and 101. J. SCHACHT, supra note 21, at 176, indicates that the hadd punishments for
robbery and theft would lapse if the offender returned the stolen property before the victim
reported the crime. Repentance would not eliminate the kisas requirement to compensate the
victim, however, and in the event a killing accompanies the robbery, no repentance is possible.
Id.
35. The author was unable to locate chapter and verse of the Koran prohibiting the
attempted overthrow of the government but the offense is listed in the sources cited above. See
sources cited supra note 25.
36. See S.H. AMIN, supra note 12, at 23-29; J. SCHACHT, supra note 21, at 175-87; THE
EFFECT OF ISLAMIC LEGISLATION, supra note 1, at 42; AI-Thakeb and Scott, supra note 21, at
66-67.
37. Thesr offenses are also specified in the Koran or the Sunnah. See supra notes 27 and
28.
38. AI-Thakeb and Scott, supra note 21, at 67. See S.H. AMIN, supra note 12; J.
SCHACHT, supra note 21; THE EFFECT OF ISLAMIC LEGISLATION, supra note 1; THE ISLAMIC
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 12.
39. Retaliation, or retribution, is literally an "eye-for-an-eye" punishment in which the
offender can be subjected to the same physical harm perpetrated upon the victim, but only if
the exact harm can be done. J. SCHACHT, supra note 21, at 185; AI-Thakeb and Scott, supra
note 21, at 67. The Koran, chapter 42, verse 40 states: "The recompense for an injury is an
injury equal thereto." THE EFFECT OF ISLAMIC LEGISLATION, supra note 1, at 219.
40. Blood money and atonement are utilized when exact retaliation is not possible or is
not desirable to the victim or the victim's family. See J. SCHACHT, supra note 21, at 185; AlThakeb and Scott, supra note 21, at 67.
41. J. SCHACHT, supra note 21, at 178-87 contains a complex description of some of the
interactions among the various offenses, punishments, burdens of proof, and levels of
culpability.
42. See AI-Thakeb and Scott, supra note 21, at 67.
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when an offense is committed against a man, he or his family should
decide what compensation will make them whole.
The third level of criminality, and second type of crime, is the
ta'zir offenses (unspecified crimes).' 3 These consist of such crimes as
forgery, bribery, embezzlement, and other offenses of a moral nature
which are not specified in the Koran or the teachings of the Prophet
Muhammad."' Offenses of this type require the least burden of proof
and provide the tribunal with virtually unlimited discretion in dispensing punishment.' 5 Although these offenses are considered to be
offenses against God, they are viewed as being more against the order of the state. It is held, therefore, that the state should set the
punishment. Punishments for ta'zir offenses include, but are not limited to, imprisonment, whipping, banishment, public degradation,
and fines."'
Although not an exhaustive discourse on Shari'a Law, the preceding discussion should provide the reader with sufficient knowledge
to understand the constitutionality analysis which follows."7 This
analysis, however, is subject to the caveat that the problem with
Shari'a Law is not necessarily within the law itself, for that has been
practiced by Muslims since the first revelation to Muhammad."8
Rather, the dilemma lies in attempting to apply Shari'a Law in conjunction with a constitution that contains irreconcilable provisions
and, subsequently, renders Shari'a Law unconstitutional.
Although the Sudanese perception of what is or is not constitutional undoubtedly differs from American perceptions,' 9 the general
concept of constitutionality is constant. The following section analyzes the conceptual constitutionality of Shari'aLaw pursuant to the
1973 Constitution and provides a comparative analysis of such laws
under similar provisions of the United States Constitution.
43.

Id.

44.

Id.

45.

Id.

46. Id. See also, THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 12, at 213-19
(addressing the scope of ta'zir offenses and punishments).
47. For the purpose of this Comment, constitutional or unconstitutional will simply denote whether a particular act is or is not in agreement with the specific constitution being
analyzed. See THE READER'S DIGEST GREAT ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY 291 (1968) (definition of constitutionality).
48.

The first revelation to Muhammad occurred in 622 A.D.
supra note 12, at xiv.

THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL

JUSTICE SYSTEM,

49. The description, "undoubtedly" different, is utilized because research has failed to
locate any sources describing Sudanese perceptions of constitutionality. It seems logical, however, that such diverse religious foundations as Islam and Christianity would develop equally
diverse perceptions of constitutionality.
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Constitutionality of Shari'a Law
The Permanent Constitution of the Sudan

In 1973, the Sudan was relatively peaceful. In March of 1972,
the government, under the regime of Jaafar Mahammed Numeiri,
ended seventeen years of civil war between Northern and Southern
Sudan with the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972. This
agreement granted complete autonomy to the Southern Region subject only to national regulation of defense, foreign affairs, currency,
economics, and inter-regional affairs. 5" In August of 1972, President
Numeiri created a Sudanese People's Assembly to draft a new constitution based upon theories of democracy and socialism.5 1 The constitution, completed in April of 1973 and promulgated in May of the
same year, was entitled "The Permanent Constitution of the
Sudan."5
The 1973 Constitution is a document of typical democratic principles. 53 Its preamble contains similar justifications for making a
constitution as are contained in the Preamble to the Constitution of
the United States and the body of the document contains two hundred and twenty-five articles. These include guarantees of personal
rights and freedoms, powers and duties of the executive, legislative,
and judiciary branches, functions of the military, state sovereignty,
supremacy of law, and a host of other rules of procedure for the
effective operation of the government. 54 The 1973 Constitution also
provides, "Islamic law and custom [Shari'a law] shall be the main
sources of legislation, Personal matters of non-Muslims shall be governed by their personal laws."' 5
These article 9 provisions served a two-fold purpose in the 1973
50. The Southern Region of the Sudan had been in a perpetual state of rebellion since
1955 when its autonomy was stripped from it by the British sovereign under a program
designed to establish self-government in the Sudan. SUDAN: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 4,

at 60-62;

D. WAI, THE AFRICAN-ARAB CONFLICT IN THE SUDAN

144-45 (1981);

15 CONSTITU-

supra note 4, at 5-6. British and Egyptian troops supported the Northern Region in
establishing dominion over the South which endeavored for the next seventeen years to regain
TIONS,

its autonomy. Id.

51. SUDAN: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 4, at 56 and 62. See S.H. AMIN, MIDDLE
EAST LEGAL SYSTEMS 329 (1985); 15 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 4, at 5-6.
52. T. NIBLOCK, CASES AND POWER IN SUDAN 261 (1987); SUDAN: A COUNTRY STUDY,
supra note 4, at 62; 15 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 4, at 6.
53. The principles of democracy entail a form of government in which political power
resides in all the people. Each citizen shares equally in political privilege and duty and the
right of each to do so is protected by free elections and other guarantees. THE READER'S DIDICTIONARY 355 (1968).
54. The English translation of the 1973 Constitution used for this Comment was at one
time an insert in 15 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 4, but has been replaced by the 1985 Constitution. It should, however, be available at law libraries carrying that series of constitutions
[hereinafter all articles of the 1973 or 1985 Constitutions will be cited only to the specific
constitution and not to the source within which constitution was found].
55. 1973 Constitution, supra note 9, art. 9.
GEST GREAT ENCYCLOPEDIC
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Constitution. The first clause of this provision, making Shari'a Law
the main source of legislation, was included to make the constitution
more acceptable to the fundamentalist Muslim religious groups of
the Northern Region."6 The second clause, guaranteeing that nonMuslims will be governed by their personal laws, was included in the
constitution to make it more acceptable to the non-Muslim religious
groups of the Southern Region and to accord the constitution with
the terms of the Addis Ababa Agreement. 5 7 Read together, these
provisions of article 9 suggest that legislation will be based upon the
principles of Shari'a Law but will not be applied to non-Muslims,
only to Muslims. Under this analysis, however, article 9 directly violates article 38 of the 1973 Constitution, which provides that "[t]he
Sudanese have equal rights and duties, irrespective of origin, race,
358 This apparent inconsistency in
locality, sex, language or religion."
the drafting of the 1973 Constitution requires reconciliation before
proceeding to a constitutionality analysis of Shari'a Law.
For all Sudanese to enjoy the equal rights guaranteed by article
38, it is necessary that only one set of laws be applied uniformly to
all. Interpreting article 9 to guarantee separate laws for Muslims
and non-Muslims renders this impossible. Thus, assuming that the
drafters of the 1973 constitution intended no inconsistencies, an alternate interpretation must be suggested. If the two provisions of article 9 are read in conjunction with, instead of in contrast to, article
38, they could suggest that Shari'a Law is merely one source of legislation, not the source of legislation, 9 and that Shari'a Law would
be applied in such a manner as to render it secular in nature, a primary demand of Southern non-Muslim Sudanese. 0 Consequently,
Shari'a Law would violate neither article 9 nor article 38.61
Such an analysis, while appearing to be contrary to the plain
language of article 9, is logical in light of the actual legal practices
at that time. When the 1973 Constitution was promulgated, the
main source of law in the Sudan was a secular hybrid of Shari'a
Law and English common law applied equally to all Sudanese. 2 It is
56. C. GURDON, supra note 6, at 66; SUDAN: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 4, at 62.
57. SUDAN: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 4, at 62.
58. 1973 Constitution, supra note 9, art. 38 (emphasis added).
59. Support for this contention can be found in a quote by President Numeiri who, when
asked about the role of Shari'a Law in the 1973 Constitution, said, "it says, 'the Islamic
Shari'a is a fundamental source among the sources of legislation', that is, it is not the sole
source." (Cited in J. VOLL AND S. VOLL, supra note 6, at 93).
60. Mayer, Khartoum: After the Fall, MIDDLE EAST EXECUTIVE REPORTS, October
1985, at 22. See also Harden, supra note 1.
61. Additionally, one set of laws based upon non-Muslim beliefs would not violate articles 9 and 38 because there is no constitutional guarantee that Muslims will be governed by
Shari'a; the Constitution only provides that non-Muslims will not be governed by Shari'a.
62. During the Mahdiya period, from 1884 to 1898, strict Shari'a Law was applied in
the Sudan. From approximately 1902 to 1955, British sovereignty gradually diminished application of Shari'a Law through interfusion with the English common law, creating an English/
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logical to presume that the drafters of the 1973 Constitution would
write it in such a way as to preserve a criminal law system which
had been successfully applied in the Sudan for seventy years.6" The
following analysis of the conceptual constitutionality of Shari'a Law
is conducted according to this presumption of the integrity of the
1973 Constitution.
B.

ConstitutionalityAnalysis of Shari'a Law

Citizens and non-citizens of the United States enjoy such personal liberties as privacy,64 equal protection," 5 freedom of religion, 6
freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, 7 and freedom of
speech 8 which are guaranteed by the Constitution of the United
States. Through the enjoyment of these rights, perceptions of what
actions are and are not constitutional have developed. These perceptions are supplemented by determinations of the United States Supreme Court - which is charged by the United States Constitution
with the duty of determining what is constitutional and what is unconstitutional.8 Conceptually, conduct which does not conform to
the Constitution is unconstitutional pursuant to the Supremacy
Clause. 70 In the Sudan, the relationship between constitutional guarantees and the evaluations by a tribunal are similar.
The 1973 Constitution of the Sudan guarantees such personal
liberties as privacy,7 1 equal rights,7 2 freedom of religion,7 3 freedom
75
7
from unusual and inhuman punishment, ' and freedom of speech.
It charges the Sudanese Supreme Court with the task of determining
Islamic hybrid. During this period the highly objectionable hadd punishments were virtually
non-existent. This hybrid law remained in force in the Sudan until 1983 when President
Numeiri promulgated strict Shari'a Law. C. GURDON, supra note 6, at 66; SUDAN: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 4, at 213; Fluehr-Lobban, Islamization of Law in the Sudan, II LEGAL STUD. F. 189, 191 and 194 (1987).
63. See supra note 62. Seventy years, from 1902 until the 1973 Constitution was written
in 1972.
64. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
65. U.S. Co NsT. amend. XIV.
66. U.S. CoNST. amend. I.
67. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
68. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
69. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803); U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 2, cl. 1.
70. U.S. CONST. art. VI ("This Constitution . . . shall be the supreme Law of the
Land.").
71. 1973 CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, art. 42 states: "The private life of citizens is
inviolable." Article 43 states: "Dwellings are inviolable."
72. "All persons . . . are equal before Courts of law. The Sudanese have equal rights
and duties, irrespective of origin, race, locality, sex, language or religion." 1973 CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, art. 38.
73. "Freedom of belief, prayer, and performance of religious practices, without infringement of public order or morals is guaranteed." 1973 CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, art. 47.
74. "No person shall be subjected to an unusual or inhuman treatment or punishment."
1973 CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, art. 72.
75. "Freedom of opinion is guaranteed. Every Sudanese shall have the right to express
his opinion in writing or verbally." 1973 CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, art. 48.
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what is constitutional,"6 and contains a supremacy clause holding
that the "Rule of Law"' is paramount .78 Non-Muslims and many
non-fundamentalist Muslims in the Sudan believe that, pursuant to
these provisions, any acts not conforming to the Constitution are
conceptually unconstitutional. 9 This belief specifically includes
Shari'a Law.
1. Hadd Offenses.-The primary objections to Shari'a Law
appear to be toward the hadd offenses and punishments. 80 This
should be understandable to the American reader who, upon first
reading the basics of Shari'a Law, is shocked to learn that adultery
and fornication, the first hadd offenses, were punishable. An American perception is that although such activities may be morally wrong
in some way, they are protected by the right to privacy and the right
to equal protection. Non-Muslims in the Sudan, and some Westernized Muslims,8 1 seem to echo this perception based upon their religious beliefs. 82 While American courts have consistently held that
adultery and fornication statutes do not deny equal protection,8" the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Sudan has simply held
that non-Muslims will not be subjected to the punishment for such
offenses and has apparently passed on the question of constitutionality.8
The non-Muslims do not seem to have a constitutionality objection to the second hadd offense of defamation. This is undoubtedly
due to recognition that even though the 1973 Constitution grants
freedom of speech,8 5 some types of speech do not deserve constitutional protection.8 6 The Sudanese echo the United States Supreme
76. 1973 CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, art. 190, cl.a.
77. "Rule of Law" is a term adapted from the British which basically means that the
law is supreme over arbitrary powers of government and that all men are equal under this law.
TURPIN, BRITISH GOVERNMENT AID THE CONSTITUTION 46-58 (1985).
78. "The State is subject to the Rule of Law and the Supremacy of the Rule of Law
shall be the basis of Government." 1973 CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, art. 59.
79. See C. GURDON, supra note 6, at 72; Tier, supra note 13, at 146-47; Mayer, supra
note 60, at 22; Sudan, 1986 I.C.J. REV. 15, 20; Sudan, 1984 I.C.J. REV. 30, 30.
80. See C. GURDON, supra note 6, at 71; Fluehr-Lobban, supra note 62, at 199-200;
Mayer, supra note 60, at 22; Sudan, 1986 I.C.J. REV. 15, 20; Sudan, 1984 I.C.J.
REV. 30, 30.
81. "Westernized Muslims" denotes those Muslims who have become accustomed to the
western standards of morality.
82. See C. GURDON, supra note 6, at 71-72. But see al-Tahir, Chief Justice Propounds
Application of Shari'a, AL-RAYAH (in arabic) Dec. 8, 1983, at 54.
83. 2 AM. JUR. 2D Adultery and Fornication § 12.5 (1964); 41 A.L.R.3D 1338, 1340
(1965).
84. Chief Justice Daf'allah al-Hajj Yusuf has stated that although the prohibition regarding alcohol applies to all citizens, the penalty for the crime of drunkenness applies only to
Muslims. See al-Tahir, supra note 82, at 53.
85. See supra note 75.
86. This is supported by language in article 48 (omitted from note 73 supra) that the
right of written and verbal expression must be "in accordance with the law." 1973 CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, art. 48.
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Court in this respect, by also recognizing the constitutionality of
87
criminal defamation.
In contrast, the third hadd offense of renunciation of the Islamic religion appears to be in direct violation of article 47 of the
1973 Constitution which explicitly protects "freedom of belief,
prayer, and performance of religious practices."8 8 It is difficult to
imagine a perception that "freedom of belief' for Muslims means
freedom to follow Islam or to die, yet there appears to be no other
way to reconcile the third hadd offense with article 47, and Muslim
authorities on Shari'a Law generally support this perception.8 9 Their
reasoning is that freedom of religion exists in choosing between belief and disbelief before embracing Islam.90 Once having been born a
Muslim or otherwise having adopted the Islamic beliefs, this freedom no longer exists because rejection of Islam would be humiliating
and derogatory to the faith and must be prevented."1
Non-Muslims, on the other hand, apparently perceive the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of religion in a more conceptual
manner. They interpret the constitutional provision to mean equal
freedom of religion for all Sudanese. 92 It is ironic to note that the
Koran tends to support the non-Muslim view, stating in chapter 2,
verse 256: "Let there be no compulsion in religion: Truth stands out
Clear from Error."93 Given this contradiction between the Muslim
perception of freedom of religion and the precepts as announced in
their scripture, it is probably safe to say that the third hadd offense
is unconstitutional.
The fourth hadd offense, drinking alcohol, is regarded by nonMuslims as an unconstitutional infringement of their right to freedom of religion. 9" The complete ban on alcohol includes the use of
sacramental wine in religious ceremonies.9 5 Accordingly, it interferes
with their freedom of worship. The Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of the Sudan justifies the constitutionality of this offense by
pointing out that the United States, India, and other countries have
at certain times in their histories prohibited alcohol. 96 Similarly, al87.
88.

Beauharnas v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
1973 CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, art. 47.

89.

THE EFFECT OF ISLAMIC LEGISLATION, supra note 1, at 84.

90. Id.
91. Id.
92. The archbishop of Khartoum (the capitol of the Sudan) has stated that, whereas
"Islamic law favours Muslims in disputes with Christians and non-Muslims, Christians believe
that all Sudanese should be equal before the law." Sudan, 1984 I.C.J. REV. 30, 30.
93. The Koran, chapter 2, verse 256. THE EFFECT OF ISLAMIC LEGISLATION, supra note
1,at 83.
94. This presumption is derived from an outcry of injustice following an incident in
which an Italian priest was sentenced to one month's imprisonment, twenty-five lashes, and a
=
L 500 fine for keeping sacramental wine in his home. Sudan, 1984 I.C.J. REV. 30, 32.
95. Id.
96. al-Tahir, supra note 82, at 53. See also THE EFFECT OF ISLAMIC LEGISLATION,
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though freedom of religion is a fundamental right in the United
States,"7 it clearly is not without certain restrictions.9 8 Subsequently,
the concept of freedom of religion is not likely to be violated by a
prohibition of alcohol, including a ban on sacramental wine.
The fifth, sixth, and seventh hadd offenses of theft, robbery, and
attempted overthrow of the government summarily can be eliminated from constitutional evaluation because there appear to be no
constitutional objections by either Muslims or non-Muslims. Article
60 of the 1973 Constitution99 empowers the Sudanese government to
enact and enforce any law which does not violate the individual liberties granted by other articles of the constitution. There is no reason
to believe that the fact that theft and robbery are outlawed by religious law rather than governmental law would change non-Muslim
perceptions of the constitutionality of making such acts punishable.
This analysis suggests that despite non-Muslim contentions that
Shari'a offenses deprive them of having equal rights with Muslims,
only one of the seven hadd offenses appears unconstitutional and
then only to the extent that it denies Muslims freedom of religion.1"
The following examination explores non-Muslim contentions that the
hadd punishments are unconstitutional and compares that analysis
with perceptions of cruel and unusual punishment and the proportionality of punishment in the United States.
2. Hadd Punishments.-There are only four hadd punishments for the seven hadd offenses. These consist of various forms of
the death penalty,"0 1 amputation of a hand or a foot,102 public flogging performed in varying numbers of lashes,10 3 and a combination
supra note 1, at 237 (citing the same justification and including an interesting cost analysis of
prohibition in the United States).
97. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
98. The United States Supreme Court has held that certain religious freedoms may be
infringed by an overriding or compelling governmental interest. See United States v. Lee, 455
U.S. 252 (1982) (forced to pay employment tax which violated Amish religion); Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (Orthodox Jew whose religion forced him to close his business on
Saturday was forced by Pennsylvania statute to close on Sunday); Bowen, Secretary of Health
and Human Services, et al. v. Roy et al., 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (American Indian family who
refused to register their daughter for a Social Security Number because it violated their religious beliefs was denied benefits).
99. "The State shall recognize and provide effective means for the protection and enjoyment of the established legal rights of all persons." 1973 CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, art.
60.
100. This was recognized by Sudanese Chief Justice Yusef who noted that Shari'a laws
have not touched the religious freedom of the non-Muslims. al-Tahir, supra note 82, at 53.
101. Some of the recommended methods for death are by crucifixion, by stoning, by the
sword, and by hanging. THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 12, at 233; Sudan, 1984 I.C.J. REV. 30, 32; Harden, supra note 1.
102. This is the punishment for theft. Robbery is punished by amputation of a hand and
a foot, each from opposite sides of the body. J. SCHACHT, supra note 21, at 181.
103. Id. at 175.
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of any or all of the first three.' 0' The non-Muslims' main contention

seems to be that these punishments are an unconstitutional violation
of their rights under article 72 of the 1973 Constitution,'0 5 which
states: "No person shall be subjected to an unusual or inhuman
treatment or punishment."' 06 Additionally, articles 70, 72, 73, 74
and 75 when read together, suggest a fairness or proportionality
standard which should be applied in dispensing punishment. 07 Furthermore, the kisas punishment of retribution clearly establishes a
proportionality standard.' 08
The application of a right such as that guaranteed by article 72
necessarily requires a value judgment about what treatment or punishment is to be considered unusual, inhuman, or both. The Muslim
perception of what types of punishment are not unusual or inhuman
seems to be clearly established by the fact that the hadd punishments have been inflicted upon followers of Islam for over 1,350
years.'0 9 Death, amputation, and flogging" 0 are the usual, common,
or ordinary"' methods of punishment for Muslims, and therefore
they are not contrary to custom. Similarly, most Muslims believe
that when the hadd punishments are carried out by trained officials
they are quite humane."' Subsequently, Muslims could reasonably
believe the hadd punishments do not contravene article 72 of the
1973 Constitution.
The same argument can be made with respect to the Muslim
perception of proportionality, most notably with the hadd offenses
and punishments. As noted in section II, there is no discretion under
Shari'a Law in applying the hadd punishment;"13 discretionary application is tantamount to second-guessing God, and therefore is improper."' Thus, if God has determined that a particular punishment
is appropriate for a particular crime, it must also be proportionate.
Non-Muslims have a different perception of what is unusual
104. For example, if a robbery victim is killed, the offender can be whipped, have a hand
and foot amputated, and then be crucified. Id. at 181; AI-Thakeb and Scott, supra note 21, at
73.
105. See C. GURDON, supra note 6, at 71.
106. 1973 CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, art. 72.
107. Article 70 prohibits infliction of punishment that exceeds that prescribed by law.
Articles 73, 74 and 75 limit the circumstances under which the death penalty can be applied.
1973 CONSTITUTION, supra note 9.
108. For retribution, or retaliation, the punishment must be the same injury as that
received by the victim. See supra note 39.
109. This represents the period of time that has passed since the revelations to Muhammad in 622 A.D. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
10. These methods of punishment comprise the hadd punishments.
I11. Unusual is defined as not usual, common, or ordinary. THE READER'S DIGEST
GREAT ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY 1470 (1968).
112. THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 12, at 230-36.
113. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
114. Id.
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and inhuman. They believe that the hadd punishments are unacceptable, contrary to human dignity, 11 5 and restrictive."' One reason for
this belief probably lies in the fact that until 1955 the non-Muslims
of the Southern Region were autonomous.1 7 The pre-colonial Arab
Muslims who had successfully imposed their religion on the indigenous population of Northern Sudan were unsuccessful in extending
their influence over the indigenous population of the Southern Region.11 8 Consequently, the Southerners were not subjected to the
harsh hadd offenses and punishments which were imposed upon the
people of the North during the Mahdiya period of 1884-1898,1" nor
were they subjected to fundamentalist Muslim religious teachings
which embrace the hadd offenses and punishments. 2 ' The Southern
government was dominated by Christian factions and their laws were
secular in nature.'" As a result, the non-Muslims could develop a
perception of unusual and inhuman punishment more similar to that
of the United States, based somewhat on the concept of Christianity.
In the United States, courts look "to the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" in determining whether a punishment is cruel 2 2 and unusual.' 23 The United
States Supreme Court has determined that any punishment involving
"unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" is presumed to be cruel
and unusual.'"" Under this philosophy, and overlooking the fact that
fundamentalist Muslims believe that pain is necessary, 25 the hadd
punishment of flogging should qualify as cruel and unusual punishment because, by its very nature, and by the admission of the Muslims who exact this punishment, 2 6 flogging inflicts pain. The line of
demarcation is thus drawn at the perception of whether the infliction
of pain is unnecessary or wanton. On this point, Muslims would disa1 28
gree' 17 while non-Muslims would probably concur.
Amputation, on the other hand, is not intended to be painful as
115. See Sudan, 1984 I.C.J. REV. 30, 30.
116. See Sudan, 1986 I.C.J. REV. 15, 20.
117. D. WAI, supra note 50, at 181-83.
118. Id. at 181.
119. Fluehr-Lobban, supra note 62, at 191-92.
120. See D. WAI, supra note 50, at 181-83.
121. See C. GURDON, supra note 6, at 65; Fluehr-Lobban, supra note 62, at 191-92.
The Southern Region is often referred to as the Christian South. Id.
122. Inhuman is defined as cruel in WEBSTERS COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 517 (5th ed.
1941). For the purpose of this Comment, the words inhuman, inhumane, and cruel will share
the same meaning.
123. Project, Sixteenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure; United States Supreme
Court and Courts of Appeals 1985-1986, 75 GEO. L.J. 713, 1168 (1987) (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
124. Id. (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981)).
125. THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 12, at 231.
126. Flogging is intended to be painful as a deterrent to future criminal activity. Id.
127. See supra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 115-21 and accompanying text.
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applied in the Sudan.1 29 Islamic jurists have established regulations
which provide who may perform an amputation and what amount of
training is required to inflict no more pain than is necessary. These
regulations are intended to render the punishment humane.' 3 0 The
non-Muslims, however, believe that mutilation of this nature is contrary to human dignity.' 31 This echoes an American belief that amputation as a form of criminal punishment is contrary to the "standards of decency," and thus is cruel, unusual, and a violation of
article 72 of the 1973 Constitution from a non-Muslim perspective.
The death penalty, however, is another matter. It does not appear that non-Muslims would object to this punishment when applied in an appropriate situation. In fact, the Christian Bible provides for death as the proper punishment for a murderer. 3 2 Thus,
the death penalty could not be said to be unusual from a non-Muslim perception, and considering the Muslim rules establishing the
training and expertise required for those people inflicting such punishment, 133 the taking of one's life as punishment is not cruel and is
not in violation of article 72.
The non-Muslim objection to the death penalty is most likely its
disproportionate application to non-capital offenses such as adultery
and apostacy. This again simply appears to be a matter of religious
difference transposed onto the civil and criminal laws. Whereas
Muslims believe that there is no discretion in applying the established hadd punishments to the offenses God has designated, 3 4 nonMuslims, would undoubtedly perceive any punishment for apostacy
to be disproportionate and violative of articles 72 and 47 of the 1973
Constitution based upon their belief that the offense of apostacy is
contrary to freedom of religion.' 35
In short, it is apparent that the Muslim leadership in the North
can justify the constitutionality of the hadd offenses and punishments as a natural part of their history and religious beliefs. Similarly, non-Muslims can justify their perceptions of the unconstitutionality of many of the hadd offenses and punishments pursuant to
their history and beliefs. Americans, who share many of the theological beliefs of the non-Muslims, are likely to support the non-Muslims' perspective while defending the Muslims' right to their own
beliefs. In practice, these differing beliefs were able to co-exist in a
relatively peaceful manner until 1983 when President Numeiri
129. See THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 12, at 232-33.
130. Id. at 232, 236.
131. Sudan, 1984 I.C.J. REV. 30, 30.
132. Numbers 35:16-18.
133. See supra notes 124-30 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
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promulgated a codification of Shari'a Law to be applied to all Sudanese, regardless of faith.
The following section analyzes the conceptual constitutionality
of the Presidential promulgation and the subsequent legislative enactment of Shari'a Law in the 1983 Penal Code pursuant to the
1973 Constitution. This section also addresses some apparent constitutional problems with the 1983 Penal Code itself.
IV.
A.

Penal Code Act of 1983"a1
Promulgation

On September 8, 1983, President Numeiri shocked his countrymen by announcing that, effective immediately, strict Shari'a Law
would be applied throughout the Sudan, to Muslims and non-Muslims alike. 137 The substance of this decree was the return of the hadd
punishments to Sudanese jurisprudence. 3 8 President Numeiri's decision was sudden, apparently made with little or no consultation with
his advisors, and caused great trepidation among Muslims and nonMuslims.1 3 9 Furthermore, his decision violated the 1973

Constitution.
Many explanations have been offered for President Numeiri's
decision. 4 Whatever his intent, it is clear that the promulgation of
Shari'a Law was pursuant to article 106 of the 1973 Constitution, 41
which provides in relevant part: "If at any time when the People's
Assembly is not in session or in cases of importance and urgency, the
President of the Republic may issue Provisional Republican Orders
having the force of law. '"142
Conceptually, a constitution is a document which embodies the

fundamental organic laws and principles for the governing of a na136. Unfortunately, the Penal Code Act of 1983 is apparently unavailable in the United
States in any language. Some brief references to it, however, are available in sources cited in
this section. Additionally, Dr. Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban, a respected American expert on
Shari'a Law in the Sudan, advises that one can gain a solid grasp of the contents of the 1983
Penal Code by understanding that it is a codification of the hadd offenses and penalties with a
few alterations.
137. C. GURDON, supra note 6, at 70; J.VOLL AND S. VOLL, supra note 6, at 93; 15
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 4, at 7; Fluehr-Lobban, supra note 62, at 198; Sudan, 1984 I.C.J.
REV. 30, 30.
138. See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
139. C. GURDON, supra note 6, at 70.
140. Among these are that God spoke to Numeiri in a dream and told him what to do,
that the decision was inspired by external political pressure, that the decision was intended to
divert the public's attention from the economic problems, and that the decision was an extension of Numeiri's policy to divide the population to facilitate easier rule. Id. at 67, 74. Numeiri
himself stated that he was returning the Sudan to its roots to get rid of the last vestiges of
colonial influence. Gordon, supra note 15, at 798. Numeiri also evidently justified his actions
as the most effective means to deter a rising crime rate. Fluehr-Lobban, supra note 62, at 198.
141. Gordon, supra note 15, at 798.
142. 1973 CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, art. 106 (as cited in Gordon, supra note 15, at
798 n.26).
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tion. 14 3 Theoretically, for an action by the government to be considered valid it must first fall within the powers specifically authorized
by the constitution, and second, it must not violate any particular
limitations that the constitution places upon those powers.""' Assuming arguendo that a case of "importance and urgency" actually existed, there can be no doubt that President Numeiri had constitutional authority pursuant to article 106 to promulgate laws. Article
106 does not, however, empower the President to make laws that
violate other provisions of the constitution, 4 5 in this case article
16(e).

146

Article 16(e) of the 1973 Constitution states in part: "Any act,
which is intended or is likely to promote feelings of hatred, enmity, 147 or discord 48 among religious communities shall be contrary
to this Constitution and punishable by law."' 4 9 This language limits
the President's power under article 106 to the promulgation of laws
which are not intended and are not likely to promote feelings of hatred, hostility, or conflict between Muslim and non-Muslim religious

communities. Assuming that at least two commentators are mistaken
in asserting that President Numeiri's promulgation of Shari'a Law
was intended to stir up dissent between Muslims and non-Mus-

lims, 150 it is inconceivable that the President would not know that his
decision was likely to promote feelings of hatred, hostility, and conflict between those groups.151
The religious conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims over
the application of Shari'a Law has continued since Muhammad re143. WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 218 (5th ed. 1941).
144. See S. EMANUEL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 16 (1987); TURPIN, supra note 77, at 17.
145. To violate or suspend any of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the 1973 Constitution, the President must first declare a State of Emergency pursuant to article I 11.
Gordon, supra note 15, at 803 n.61. In the case of the promulgation of Shari'aLaw, Numeiri
did not do this.
146.

1973 CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, art. 16(e).

147. Enmity is defined as a deep-seated unfriendliness accompanied by readiness to
quarrel or fight; hostility; antagonism. THE READER'S DIGEST GREAT ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY 440 (1968).

148. Discord is synonymous with conflict. Id. at 379.
149. 1973 CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, art. 16(E) (emphasis added). The omitted portion of article 16(e) states "The abuse of religious and noble spiritual beliefs for political
exploitation is forbidden." If Numeiri's reasons for promulgation of Shari'a Law were internal
and external political pressures, supra note 140, it appears to violate this provision, also.
150. One commentator indicates that Numeiri may have intended to stir up trouble between the Muslims and non-Muslims to shift their attention away from the country's economic
problems. C. GURDON, supra note 6, at 67. Another commentator indicates that the "process
of Islamization was to exacerbate the rebellion of the South, united as it was against the
religious intolerance of the North." Sudan, 1984 I.C.J. REV. 30, 30-31.
151. C. GURDON, supra note 6, at 74, points out that Numeiri either "seriously miscalculated the reaction of the South or did not take it into consideration." This does not seem
likely, however, considering that the South was already discontent over Numeiri's abrogation
of the Addis Abada Agreement of 1972. The South's violent reaction to the loss and subsequent redivision of its autonomy should have suggested to Numeiri that the Southern reaction
to Shari'a Law would not be positive.
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ceived the revelation from God in the seventh century A.D.1" 2 It is
clear that after more than 1,350 years of hatred, hostility, and conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims, promulgation of Shari'a
Law in a country containing 70% Muslims and 30% non-Muslims
"is likely" to promote more hatred, hostility, and conflict among
those religious groups. 153 Since President Numeiri's promulgation of
Shari'a Law was likely to promote feelings of hatred, enmity and
discord among religious communities, it violated the limitations
which article 16(e) places upon the power to act pursuant to article
106 and was therefore contrary to the 1973 Constitution.
B.

Enactment

The 1983 Penal Code was authored by Hassan al Turabi,1 5 4 the
Sudanese Attorney General, and contains definitions of existing
kisas and ta'zir crimes, provisions for crimes not previously criminal,
and a set of punishments not previously applied, the hadd punishments.1 55 Some previous offenses, such as theft, were modified to reflect the hadd punishment of amputation, reserved for more serious
cases of theft, while the hadd offense of adultery and fornication was
redefined to include rape and sodomy. 156 Essentially, the 1983 Penal
Code is a codification of modified Shari'a Law and a written version
of the law promulgated by President Numeiri on September 8, 1983.
As such, it became an enactment of a law that the legislature had no
more power to make than had President Numeiri, and subsequently,
that violated article 16(e). 1 5 7 As enacted, the 1983 Penal Code appears to have been drafted without strict adherence to the 1973 Constitution. For example, section 318 of the 1983 Penal Code states
that:
[T]he penalty specified in sub-sections (1) and (2) above [death
for a married fornicator and whipping, exile, and imprisonment
for a male unmarriedfornicator] shall not be imposed upon any
person whose Heavenly Religion provides an alternative penalty
152. See supra note 48.
153. The Sudan's population is comprised of about 70% Muslim and 30% non-Muslim.
Of the non-Muslims, about 70% are animist, or traditional African religions, and 30% are
Christian. Fluehr-Lobban, supra note 62, at 189; Sudan, 1984 i.C.J. REV. 30, 30.
154. Hassan al Turabi is the brother-in-law of Sadiq el Mahdi, the current Prime Minister of the Sudan, and holds a doctorate in law from London University. He is also the leader of
the rightest National Islamic Front, a strong fundamentalist political group, and remains a
prominent figure in Sudanese politics. J. VOLL AND S. VOLL, supra note 6, at 93; Harden,
supra note I. See also ISLAM, NATIONALISM AND RADICALISM IN EGYPT AND THE SUDAN, 11342 (1983) (an article on the evolution of Islamic Fundamentalism in which the author, John
Voll, provides additional background regarding Turabi's political activities).
155. S.H. AMIN, supra note 51, at 341-42; Fluehr-Lobban, supra note 62, at 198.
156. S.H. AMIN, supra note 51, at 341-42. Dr. Amin's book was the only source located
citing chapter and verse of the 1983 Penal Code and thus is relied upon heavily.
157. For the legislature (called the People's Assembly) to enact the 1983 Penal Code it
would first have to repeal article 16(e). Repeal, however, was not attempted.
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for fornication. In such cases the offender shall be punished by
the alternative penalty provided by his religion.158
In contrast, article 38 of the 1973 Constitution provides that "the
Sudanese have equal rights . . .irrespective of

. .

.sex

. . .

or reli-

gion." ' 159 Accordingly, section 318 of the 1983 Penal Code, by differentiating between male and female offenders and between Muslim
and non-Muslim offenders, denies each group the equal rights guaranteed by article 38.160
Section IV reveals that, in addition to the basic non-Muslim objections of Shari'a Law, both the promulgation of Shari'a Law by
President Numeiri and its subsequent enactment in the Penal Code
Act of 1983 were violations of article 16(e) of the 1973 Constitution
and, hence, unconstitutional. Additionally, the 1983 Penal Code, itself, is not without constitutional violations.
The following section introduces the Transitional Constitution
of the Republic of the Sudan 1985. This section compares the 1985
Constitution with the 1973 Constitution while assessing the effect of
applying it in conjunction with Shari'a Law and the 1983 Penal
Code.
V. The Transitional Constitution of the Republic of the Sudan
1985
On April 6, 1985, the Sudanese military executed a coup d'etat
deposing President Numeiri during his visit to the United States.1 6 '
The new Transitional Military Government, which adopted the
Transitional Constitution of the Republic of the Sudan 1985 on October 10 of that year, promised the adoption of a new Permanent
Constitution after the election of a Constituent Assembly to replace
the People's Assembly."6 2 In addition, the new government halted
the application of the hadd punishments of the 1983 Penal Code but
left the Penal Code itself in force.'
The 1985 Constitution is remarkably similar to the 1973 Constitution in granting such specific personal liberties as equal protection, 64 freedom of religion, 6 5 freedom of speech, 6 right to pri158. S.H. AMIN, supra note 51, at 342 (emphasis added).
159. 1973 CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, art. 38.
160. Admittedly, the constitutional conflict of one section of the 1983 Penal Code does
not render the entire act unconstitutional. Unfortunately, the entire act was not available for
such scrutiny.
161. 15 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 4, at 8; Fluehr-Lobban, supra note 62, at 189.
162. As of November 1988, however, the 1985 Transitional Constitution was still in
force although somewhat amended. Telephone interview with Dr. Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban
(November 1988). See infra note 179.
163. Misapplication of Shari'a Law by the Numeiri regime had been a primary reason
for the coup. Fluehr-Lobban, supra note 62, at 190; Mayer, supra note 60, at 21-23.
164. T985 CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, art. 17(l)(2).
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vacy,167 and freedom from inhumane and undignified punishment."6 8
Due to the similarity, Shari'a Law under the 1985 Constitution can
be subjected to the same analysis as it was pursuant to the 1973
Constitution. Thus, the hadd offense of apostacy remains a violation
of the freedom of religion pursuant to article 18 of the 1985 Constitution. 6 9 In addition, the hadd offenses of adultery and fornication,
drinking alcohol, theft, armed robbery, and attempting to overthrow
the government do not violate the 1985 Constitution17 0 because they
are not deemed fundamental rights. On the other hand, the offense
of defamation remains a legitimate infringement on the freedom of
speech. 171 Similarly, from a non-Muslim perspective the hadd punishments of flogging and amputation remain a violation of the freedom from inhumane and undignified punishment pursuant to article
29 of the 1985 Constitution,1 72 while the hadd punishment of death
remains constitutional when applied to the hadd offense of robbery
aggravated by the killing of the victim and to the offense of attempting to overthrow the government. The death penalty remains a violation of article 29 when applied to the offense of adultery and fornication and to the offense of apostacy. 7 3
Although the 1983 Penal Code continued to be applied,7 4
changes in governmental policy and in the 1985 Constitution resolved some of the Code's constitutionality problems. First, the Transitional Military Government suspended the application of the hadd
punishments of the 1983 Penal Code. This action eliminated the potential article 29 constitutionality problems arising from the execution of those punishments. Second, the 1985 Constitution does not
contain a state religion pronouncement similar to that of article
16(a-e) of the 1973 Constitution. Further, whereas promulgation of
Shari'a Law was a violation of article 16(e) of the 1973 Constitution, the 1985 Constitution contains no direct ban on enactment of
165. Id. art. 18.
166. Id. art. 19.
167. Id. art. 21, art. 30.
168. Id. art. 29. Note that the 1985 Constitution grants a freedom from inhumane and
undignified punishment as opposed to the freedom from unusual and inhuman punishment
granted by the 1973 Constitution. This difference could have some effect on the constitutionality of the practice of public floggings entirely separate from the constitutionality of flogging
itself. Similarly, it raises the question of whether unusual punishments are to be permitted.
169. Compare with supra note 88 and accompanying text.
170. Compare with supra notes 80, 94, 99 and accompanying text.
171. Compare with supra note 85 and accompanying text.
172. Compare with supra note 101 and accompanying text.
173. Compare with supra notes 80, 88 and accompanying text.
174. Pursuant to article 133 of the 1985 Constitution, "all laws in force immediately
prior to the coming into force of this Constitution shall continue unless repealed or amended
by the competent authority." Although the hadd punishments were halted, the 1983 Penal
Code remained in force. See Fluehr-Lobban, supra note 62, at 200; Mayer, supra note 60, at
22.
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acts which are "likely to promote feelings of hatred, enmity, or discord among religious communities" and the government may constitutionally enact legislation accordingly. Finally, the 1985 Constitution contains no provision equivalent to article 106 of the 1973
Constitution which granted the President power to make laws under
"importan[t] and urgen[t]" conditions, eliminating the need for the
constitutional offset of an article similar to article 16(e) of the 1973
Constitution.
The effect of the 1985 Constitution on the constitutionality of
Shari'a Law is minima 17 5 because it provides personal liberties similar to those set forth in the 1973 Constitution. The promulgation of
Shari'a Law through the retention of the 1983 Penal Code appears
constitutional since the 1985 Constitution does not contain article
16(e) limitations. The application of Shari'a Law, as codified in the
1983 Penal Code, was shorn of much of its unconstitutionality by the
elimination of the hadd punishments. In effect, the Transitional Military Government had returned the Sudanese criminal law to a pre1983 status wherein one set of laws, albeit Shari'a Law instead of
the British/Islamic hybrid, was applied to all Sudanese equally.
The issue of Shari'a Law remained a primary concern to the
non-Muslim Southern Region, however, and its abrogation a major
demand before ending the civil war.'7 6 In response to this concern,
Prime Minister Sadiq el Mahdi, on July 7, 1986, required the Sudan's Attorney General, Hassan al Turabi, to create substitute statutes for the Shari'a Law of the 1983 Penal Code.' 77 The resultant
construct was the Penal Code Act of 1988, which is discussed in the
following section.
VI.

Penal Code Act of 1988178

The 1988 Penal Code was passed by the Constituent Assembly
in early October 1988.7' According to the 1986 campaign promises
of Prime Minister Sadiq el Mahdi, the Code was to be a moderation
of Shari'a Law that would be acceptable to both Muslims and nonMuslims.1 80 This does not appear to have occurred. The new penal
175. The only real change in the fundamental rights is in the wording of article 29
which is discussed supra note 168.
176. Mayer, Law and Religion in the Muslim Middle East, 35 AM. J. COMP. L. 127,
135 (Winter 1987); Sudan, 1986 I.C.J. REV. 15, 20-21.
177. 15 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 4, at 9.
178. Like the 1983 Penal Code, the 1988 Penal Code is not available in the United
States in any language. The information on the 1988 Penal Code used in this Comment is
located in Harden, supra note 1. Out of necessity, section VI assumes that the information in
the Harden article is substantially correct.
179. Information of the passage of the 1988 Penal Code by the Constituent Assembly
was provided by Dr. Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban of the Anthropology Department at Rhode Island
College.
180. Harden, supra note 1.
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code reportedly is nothing more than a revision of the 1983 Penal
Code, but more rigidly fundamental in following strict Shari'a
Law. 18 1 The moderation supposedly will come in the alleged nonapplicability of the 1988 Penal Code to non-Muslims. 182 This, however, will do little to relieve the basic unconstitutionality of codified
Shari'a Law.
According to available reports, the 1988 Penal Code explicitly
contains the hadd punishments of death-by-stoning for adultery,
death for apostacy, amputation for theft and armed robbery, and
flogging for homosexuality. 183 If the reports are accurate, the 1988
Penal Code is no more constitutional than its predecessor, the 1983
Penal Code. In fact, the 1988 version is less constitutional than the
earlier Code. The 1985 Constitution, which is still in force, guarantees freedom of religion to all Sudanese, not just non-Muslims. 1 8 '
Criminalization of apostacy, even when applied only to Muslims, is
nevertheless a deprivation of religious freedom. Similarly, the hadd
punishments violate the freedom from inhumane punishment under
article 29 of the 1985 Constitution just as they violated article 72 of
the 1973 Constitution, regardless of application. Finally, the imposition to Muslims of a set of laws different from those applied to nonMuslims violates the equal protection guaranteed by article 17(1)(2)
of the 1985 Constitution regardless of the justifications. The result is
that the 1988 Penal Code, assuming that it contains the provisions
reported, violates the 1985 Constitution in much of its proposed application and reverts Sudanese criminal law to its status under the
Numeiri regime; unacceptable to Muslims and non-Muslims.' 8 5
VII.

Conclusion

To correlate the continuing problem of the co-existence of a Sudanese constitution and Shari'a Law, remember first that Shari'a
Law is an ancient religious doctrine and was applied in its strictest
form from 1884 to 1898 in Northern Sudan; Southern Sudan was
autonomous and applied secular laws. After 1898, the British spent
fifty-four years diluting Shari'a Law with English common law and
the hadd punishments were no longer applied. Freedoms of religion,
speech, privacy, equal protection, and freedom from cruel and unusual punishments existed for all Sudanese.
181. Id.
182. When Numeiri promulgated Shari'a Law in 1983 it was also under the alleged
non-applicability to non-Muslim. Within one year, however, flogging of non-Muslims for alcohol consumption became commonplace and at least seven non-Muslims had been sentenced to
amputation. Fluehr-Lobban, supra note 62, at 199; Sudan, 1984 I.C.J. REv. 30, 30.
183. Harden, supra note I.
184. 1985 CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, art. 18.
185. Mayer, supra note 176, at 135.
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In 1954, the British relinquished control of the entire Sudan
(Muslim North and non-Muslim South) to the Muslim leadership in
the North and left the country to its own rule. During the ensuing
twenty-nine years the Sudanese government was overthrown three
times for various political reasons with each new government drafting a new constitution containing fundamental personal liberties and
continuing to apply the British/Islamic hybrid criminal laws which
conceptually conformed to each constitution.
The problem of constitutionality with respect to Shari'a Law
began in 1983 when the Numeiri regime, which had enacted its constitution in 1973, abrogated the British/Islamic laws in favor of
strict Shari'a Law which contained provisions in violation of the existing constitution. This resulted in the overthrow of the Numeiri regime in 1985, the creation of another new constitution containing the
same fundamental personal liberties, and the return to a criminal
law system similar to that successfully applied in the Sudan for
eighty-three years. In 1988, .however, the new government returned
to the same Shari'a Law which it disfavored to such an extent that
the Numeiri government was overthrown. The first question that one
poses is, "Why?"; but the answer is not yet known. The second inquiry is, "When is the next coup?"
From an American perspective, Shari'a Law may never be constitutional because by its very nature it infringes upon the fundamental rights of freedom of religion and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment. Codification of Shari'a Law in its strict form also
may never be constitutional unless the freedom of religion and the
freedom from cruel and unusual punishment provisions are omitted
from the constitution or the offense of apostacy and the hadd punishments are omitted from codified Shari'a Law. If one of these alternative solutions is applied equally to Muslims and non-Muslims,
Shari'a Law and a democratic constitution may be able to co-exist
in the Sudan. Until then, the fighting continues.
Steven C. Sherman

